Mirroring Intentional Forgetting in a Shared-Goal Learning Situation by Racsmány, Mihály et al.
Mirroring Intentional Forgetting in a Shared-Goal
Learning Situation
Miha ´ly Racsma ´ny
1,2*, Attila Keresztes
1.,P e ´ter Pajkossy
1., Gyula Demeter
1.
1Department of Cognitive Science, Budapest University of Technology and Economics, Budapest, Hungary, 2Institute of Psychology, University of Szeged, Szeged,
Hungary
Abstract
Background: Intentional forgetting refers to the surprising phenomenon that we can forget previously successfully
encoded memories if we are instructed to do so. Here, we show that participants cannot only intentionally forget episodic
memories but they can also mirror the ‘‘forgetting performance’’ of an observed model.
Methodology/Principal Findings: In four experiments a participant observed a model who took part in a memory
experiment. In Experiment 1 and 2 observers saw a movie about the experiment, whereas in Experiment 3 and 4 the
observers and the models took part together in a real laboratory experiment. The observed memory experiment was a
directed forgetting experiment where the models learned two lists of items and were instructed either to forget or to
remember the first list. In Experiment 1 and 3 observers were instructed to simply observe the experiment (‘‘simple
observation’’ instruction). In Experiment 2 and 4, observers received instructions aimed to induce the same learning goal for
the observers and the models (‘‘observation with goal-sharing’’ instruction). A directed forgetting effect (the reliably lower
recall of to-be-forgotten items) emerged only when models received the ‘‘observation with goal-sharing’’ instruction
(P,.001 in Experiment 2, and P,.05 in Experiment 4), and it was absent when observers received the ‘‘simple observation’’
instruction (P..1 in Experiment 1 and 3).
Conclusion: If people observe another person with the same intention to learn, and see that this person is instructed to
forget previously studied information, then they will produce the same intentional forgetting effect as the person they
observed. This seems to be a an important aspect of human learning: if we can understand the goal of an observed person
and this is in line with our behavioural goals then our learning performance will mirror the learning performance of the
model.
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Introduction
A flexible memory needs a mechanism by which it can disregard
earlier encoded information that is no longer reliable, is irrelevant
or even disturbing. The experimental procedure called directed
forgetting (DF) demonstrates this relevant aspect of human
memory. In a typical directed forgetting experiment participants
first learn a set of items, usually a list of words (henceforth: List 1),
then receive an instruction either to forget or to remember these
items. This paradigm is called the list method of directed forgetting
and studies using this procedure demonstrated that following
learning of further items (henceforth: List 2), participants can recall
significantly fewer of the items designated to be forgotten
compared to those that were to be remembered [1–4]. The
experimental work of the last thirty years has revealed many
attributes of the DF effect and the brain mechanisms involved in
this phenomenon have also become clear [5,6,7–13].
The dominant theory of directed forgetting was framed by
Bjork [1] who suggested that the forget instruction elicits a process
in participants which suppresses the access of List 1 items,
although this process is modulated by factors such as list
segregation and recall output order. According to Bjork [1] the
suppression of List 1 items serves an adaptive goal for participants
to escape from proactive interference while studying List 2 items
(see Racsma ´ny and Conway [14] for an extension of this concept
to episodic retrieval). This idea was supported by experimen-
tal results showing that recall performance of List 2 items is
significantly higher following a forget instruction than following
a remember instruction of List 1 items, although this beneficial
effect of forget instruction has not been present constantly in
directed forgetting experiments (see[2]). The suppression theory of
directed forgetting received strong support both from neuroimag-
ing studies and from investigations of patients suffering from brain
damage or psychiatric disorders. For instance, Mecklinger, Para
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directed forgetting experiment elicited a right frontal activation
following the forget instruction. This brain area – and especially
the right inferior frontal gyrus - is associated to inhibition of
prepotent responses [15,16] (see also [6]). Ba ¨uml, Hanslmayr,
Pasto ¨tter and Klimesch [17] showed that forget instruction induces
a change in alpha oscillations which is assumed to be an active
neural inhibitory filter. Furthermore, patients with lesion in the
right frontal cortex and patients diagnosed with schizophrenia –
known to have frontal dysfunctions [18] - were unable to produce
a directed forgetting effect [11,19].
An alternative explanation of directed forgetting was proposed
by Sahakyan and Kelley [20] who suggested that the forget
instruction produce a change in mental context of participants and
this change serves as a key factor for later recall patterns.
According to this explanation, directed forgetting is just another
example of context dependent memory phenomenon. Participants
in the forget group change their internal context as a response to
the forget instruction, therefore they are studying List 2 items in a
changed mental context and finally they try to recall List 1 and
List 2 items in this new mental context. In contrast, participants
who receive a remember instruction will learn both lists in the
same internal context. Sahakyan and Delaney [21] suggested that
only the cost of directed forgetting (the decreased List 1 recall
performance in the forget group) is explained by contextual
change, while other factors, such as changed learning strategy,
contribute to the benefit of forget instruction (the higher recall of
List 2 items in the forget group). The results of these experiments
gave evidence that instructing participants to intentionally change
their mental context produced the same level of forgetting of List 1
items as the ‘standard’ forget instruction (see [22]).
A fundamental difference between these two concepts of
directed forgetting is the role of participant’s goal in the causal
explanation of the phenomenon. According to the framework of
Bjork [1], suppression of the first list is a goal-related response to
the forget instruction, where the goal of the participant is to learn
valid and disregard invalid information. In contrast, the context
change hypothesis [20] proposes that the suppression of the first
list is a side effect of the instruction. The forget instruction
segregates the two learning lists and creates different contexts for
them, however the goal of the participant does not play a causal
role in this process. It is difficult to discriminate the predictions of
the two explanatory concepts in the standard directed forgetting
procedure, because we should manipulate independently the goal
of participants and the type of instructions they receive. However,
the type of the instruction always determines the goal of the
participant, thus these two factors are strongly associated in the
standard DF procedure. We can discriminate these two factors, if
participants are not directly instructed, but observe another
person, a model, who receive a forget instruction. This way it is
possible to manipulate independently the goal of the observer
(congruent or incongruent with the goal of the model) and the type
of instruction (forget or remember) given to the model.
Dissociating goal and instruction is also fruitful from a more
general point of view. The directed forgetting procedure is a
paradigmatic case of intentional learning, where a learner has to
keep relevant information in an active form while has to suppress
irrelevant information. From the perspective of an adaptive
cognitive system we can assume that participants are able to
produce an intentional suppression of successfully studied
information by detecting which information is relevant and which
is irrelevant for an observed model. By applying the directed
forgetting procedure in an observational learning task, where the
relevant information must be extracted from the interaction of the
experimenter and the observed model, it is possible to get evidence
for the adaptiveness of intentional forgetting.
The central question of the present study was whether or not
observers were able to mirror the learning performance of an
observed model who had received a forget instruction. Consider-
ing the learning process as a specific action, we aimed to
investigate the role of the observer’s goal in activating and
suppressing memories. In research on action understanding there
are many observations of an action eliciting the same brain activity
pattern in motor planning areas as the actual execution of that
same action [23–26]. Moreover, studies using various stopping
paradigms have demonstrated that the observers mirrored
inhibitory attention processes along with the perceived person’s
action [27,28]. However, so far there has been no demonstration
of mirroring explicit goal-related memory access.
According to our hypothesis, observers can mirror the intentional
forgetting performance of an observed model, but only if they share
the same goal in the learning situation. If the observers’ goal is
simply to observe the behaviour of the observed model, they will not
mirror intentional forgetting; therefore, they will remember the to-
be-forgotten information. We assume that a forget instruction elicits
suppression of earlier encoded information only if this instruction
targets goal relevant information for the observer.
We developed a modified version of the DF procedure aimed at
investigating whether or not participants are able to simulate the
intentional forgetting performance of a model. In this experimen-
tal procedure, called observational directed forgetting (oDF),
participants (the observers) observe another person (the model)
taking part in a directed forgetting experiment.
Methods
We have obtained ethics approval for our study from the ethics
committee of the Budapest University of Technology and
Economics, Hungary, all participants gave written consent.
Experiment 1 & 2
In two consecutive experiments, a total of 200 native Hungarian
speakers were recruited from the Budapest University of
Technology and Economics student population. They received
course credits for their participation. One hundred participants (45
males and 55 females) took part in each experiment, their ages
varied between 19 and 26 years.
In both experiments, participants (referred to as observers
throughout the article) watched a movie of a directed forgetting
experiment. In this movie, a model learnt a list of words (List 1),
then received a midlist instruction (forget or remember), then
learnt another list of words (List 2). In both experiments, observers
were randomly assigned to either the forget or the remember
group.
The two experiments differed only in the instruction given to
the observers prior to watching the movie. In Experiment 1, they
were told simply to observe everything they saw in order to
remember it later on (‘‘simple observation’’), whereas in
Experiment 2 observers were told to observe everything they
saw in order to remember what the model in the movie had to
remember (‘‘observation with goal sharing’’).
In the movie presented to the observers, a male model sat in
front of a computer screen and was told by an experimenter that
he would be presented with a list of words and that his task was to
learn all of the words for a later memory test. Each word was
displayed for 2 s with a 2-s inter-item interval. When filming the
movies we used two experimental learning lists (List A and List B)
consisting of 12 words of moderate to high frequency. Half of the
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List 1, and List B served as List 2, while the other half of the
observers saw a version in which List A served as List 2 and List B
as List 1. After List 1 had been presented on the screen the
experimenter gave either a ‘‘forget’’ or a ‘‘remember’’ instruction.
In the ‘‘forget’’ condition, the model in the movie received the
instruction that the words presented up until this point were only
presented by mistake, and the experimenter asked the model to try
to forget these words in order to properly carry out the learning of
the following words. Following the forget instruction the model
was presented with a second list of 12 words. In the ‘‘remember’’
condition, the experimenter in the movie gave a remember
instruction following List 1; that is, he asked the model to
remember the words presented up until that point and to try to
learn the words in the second list as well. Following the
presentation of List 2, the experimenter thanked the model for
their contribution.
Following the presentation of the movie, observers took part in a
distractor task in which they solved simple arithmetic tasks for
10 min. Then they were asked to recall all the words that had been
presented to the model in the movie. All observers were first asked
to recall List 1, and then List 2 words, in order to avoid a possible
output interference of List 2 words in the forget condition.
Experiment 3 & 4
In two further experiments, a total of 208 native Hungarian
speakers were recruited from the Budapest University of
Technology and Economics student population. One hundred-
twenty participants (43 males and 77 females) took part in
Experiment 3, and eighty-eight participants (39 males and 49
females) took part in Experiment 4. Their ages varied between 19
and 28 years. Data of four participants (two models and one
observer) was excluded from the analysis of Experiment 3, and
data of three participants (two models and one observer) was
excluded from the analysis of Experiment 4, because they figured
out the goal of the experiment, as it was revealed by the debriefing.
The two experiments followed the same logic as Experiment 1
and 2 with the only exception that this time the observed model
was a real participant, not only an actor in a movie.
Two participants (one model and one observer) took part in the
experiment at the same time. Each participant pair (observer and
model) was randomly assigned to either the remember or the
forget group and each member of the pair was randomly assigned
to be the observer or the model in the experiment. First, the
observers were informed that they would take part in a memory
experiment as an observer where a model would learn lists of
words for a later recall. The observer was also informed that the
aim of their participation is to warm up for a later memory
experiment. Similarly to Experiment 1, in Experiment 3 observers
received a ‘‘simple observation’’ instruction; that is, their task was
to watch carefully and observe everything they saw, because later
they would have to remember it. Similar to Experiment 2, in
Experiment 4 observers received an ‘‘observation with goal
sharing’’ instruction; that is, their task was to watch carefully
and observe everything they saw, but crucially they were also
informed that at the final recall test there would be a possibility to
help the model if she/he asks for it.
The model and the observer sat close to each other in front of a
computer screen, in a distance from the screen so that both of
them could easily read the presented stimuli. Each word was
displayed for 2 s with a 2-s inter-item interval. The experimenter
gave instructions only to the model, who were informed that they
would be presented with a list of words and were to learn all of the
words for a later memory test. After the first list of words had been
presented on the screen the experimenter gave either a ‘‘forget’’ or
a ‘‘remember’’ instruction to the model. In the ‘‘forget’’ condition
the models received the instruction that the words presented up
until that point were only presented by mistake, and the
experimenter asked them to try to forget those in order to
properly carry out the learning of subsequent words. After the
forget instruction the models were presented with a second list of
words. In the ‘‘remember’’ condition the experimenter gave a
remember instruction following List 1, asking the models to
remember the words presented up until that point and to try to
learn the words on the second list as well.
After the presentation of List 2, both the models and the
observers took part in a distractor task, solving simple arithmetical
problems for 10 minutes. Then they were asked to recall all the
words that had been presented to the model in the movie. All
observers were first asked to recall List 1, and then List 2 words, in
order to avoid a possible output interference of List 2 words in the
forget condition.
Results
In all four experiments the same mixed ANOVA was carried
out with instruction (Forget/Remember) as between subject
variable and list (List 1/List 2) as within subject variable. In
Experiment 3 and 4, recall data of models and observers were
analysed separately, and when discussing these results, we report
data for models first, and data for observers second.
Experiment 1
We found a significant main effect of list, F(1,98)=13.15,
P,.001, but no significant interaction between list and instruction,
F(1,98)=0.02, ns. Independent t-tests showed that, on average,
observers in the forget group and the remember group recalled the
same proportion of List 1 words, t(99)= 20.67, ns., and the same
proportion of List 2 words, t(99)= 20.66, ns. This supports our
hypothesis that observers with an attitude of merely observing a
learning action of a model will not produce the same memory
performance as the observed model; therefore, they will not
produce an intentional forgetting of List 1 in the forget condition
(see Figure 1, upper part of panel B).
Experiment 2
The same ANOVA as in Experiment 1 yielded a significant main
effect of list, F(1, 98)=20.08, P,.001, and more importantly, a
significant interaction between list and instruction, F(1,98)=17.4,
P,.001. Independent t-tests revealed that observers in the forget
group recalled fewer List 1 words, t(99)=2.19, P,.05, r=.22, but
more List 2 words, t(99)=2.83, P,.01, r=.27, than observers in the
remember group. This recall pattern shows that our manipulation
was successful in inducing a directed forgetting effect. (see Figure 1,
lower part of panel B).
Experiment 3
Models. The list X instruction interaction was significant,
F(1,58)=10.56, P,.005. Independent t-tests revealed that models
in the forget group recalled fewer List 1 words, t(58)= 22.67,
P,.01, r=.33, but more List 2 words, t(58)=1.29, ns., than
models in the remember group. Although this latter effect, the
benefit of directed forgetting instruction, was not significant, our
manipulation was successful in inducing a directed forgetting
pattern among models (see Figure 2, upper part of panel C).
Observers. Observers showed a different pattern compared
to the models they had observed. Their recall data showed
no significant list X instruction, F(1,54)=2.54, P=.117. Also,
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PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 3 January 2012 | Volume 7 | Issue 1 | e29992Figure 1. Experimental set-up and results of Experiment 1 and 2. (A) In both experiments the observers sat in front of a computer screen on
which they saw a movie of a directed forgetting experiment. In this movie, a model was instructed to learn a list of words shown on a computer
screen, and was then shown a second list that was also to be learnt. Immediately before being presented with the second list to learn, the model in
this movie received a midlist instruction. Half of the observers saw a movie where the model was instructed to forget the list that they had seen
before and to learn the second list (this is the forget condition shown here). The other half of the observers saw a movie where the model was
instructed to remember the second list as well (the remember condition). In experiment 1 (upper part of panel B), the observers were simply told to
observe the movie in order to remember as many details as possible (simple observation). Here, we found no directed forgetting effect: after
watching the movie the observers recalled a similar number of words in the two conditions, P..1. In experiment 2 (lower part of panel B), the
observers were told to observe the movie in order to remember everything that the model in the movie had to remember (observation with goal-
sharing). Here, we found a significant directed forgetting effect: after watching the movie the observers in the forget condition recalled significantly
fewer words from the first list and recalled significantly more words from the second list than the observers in the remember condition, P,.001.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0029992.g001
Figure 2. Experimental set-up and results of Experiment 3 and 4. (A) In both experiments participants sat in front of a computer screen and
participated in a directed forgetting experiment (we refer to these participants as models and their results are shown in panel C). They were
instructed to learn a list of words (List 1) shown on the screen. Immediately after being presented with List 1, the models received a midlist
instruction. Half of the models was instructed to forget the list (List 1) they had seen before, and learn the second list (List 2). This is the forget
condition shown here. The other half of the models was instructed to remember List 2 as well (remember condition). Models (panel C) in both
Experiments showed directed forgetting. Each model was observed by another participant (we refer to these participants as observers and their
result are shown in panel B). In experiment 3, observers (upper part of panel B) were told simply to observe the experiment in order to remember as
many details as possible (simple observation). Here, we found no directed forgetting effect: after watching the experiment, observers in the forget
and remember condition recalled a similar number of List 1 words, and observers in the remember condition recalled more words from List 2 than
observers in the forget condition. In experiment 4, observers (lower part of panel B) were told to observe the experiment in order to be able to help
the model in the experiment (observation with goal-sharing). Here, we found a significant directed forgetting effect: after watching the experiment,
observers in the forget condition recalled significantly less words from List 1 than observers in the remember condition.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0029992.g002
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recalled a similar proportion of List 1 words, t(54)=0.43, ns., and
a lower proportion of List 2 words, t(54)=1.69, ns., compared to
observers in the remember group. In brief, in this group we found
no directed forgetting effect (see Figure 2, upper part of panel B).
Experiment 4
Models. The list X instruction interaction was significant,
F(1,40)=12.34, P,.001. Independent t-tests revealed that models
in the forget group recalled fewer List 1 words, t(40)= 23.47,
P,.001, r=.48, but more List 2 words t(40)=0.51, ns., than
models in the remember group. Again, as for models in
Experiment 3, although the benefit of directed forgetting
instruction was not significant, our manipulation was successful
in inducing a directed forgetting pattern among participants (see
Figure 2, lower part of panel C).
Observers. In contrast to Experiment 3, observers in
Experiment 4 showed a similar pattern as the models they had
observed. Their recall data showed significant list X instruction,
F(1,41)=4.24, P,.05. Also, independent t-tests revealed that
observers in the forget group recalled fewer List 1 words, t(41)=
22.36, P,.05, r=.35, and a similar proportion of List 2 words,
t(41)=.12, ns., compared to observers in the remember group. In
brief, although we found no benefit of the directed forgetting
instruction for the forget group, the observers showed a clear
directed forgetting effect (see Figure 2, lower part of panel B).
Discussion
In Experiment 1 and 2 we demonstrated that observers mirror
the effect of the forget instruction given to an observed model.
This mirroring only occurred when the instruction given to the
observers induced shared goal representations.
Although Experiment 1 and 2 gave evidence that suppression of
the to-be-forgotten items is modulated by the observer’s goal, the
applied instruction and the specific way of item presentation raised
a series of question with respect to the above interpretation of our
results. Did the instruction to remember everything that the model
had to remember induce any empathy/goal sharing with the
model, or did the observers simply interpret the instruction given
to the model as an instruction given to them? Another problem in
our interpretation might be that the model did not suppress
memories (models were actors in a movie). Therefore we cannot
infer that the forgetting effect produced by the observers is truly a
mirrored effect.
To clarify these questions we changed both the learning
situation and the goal-sharing instruction in two following
experiments. In Experiment 3 and 4, instead of watching a movie
about an experiment, observers observed a directed forgetting
experiment in a real-life setting, with real experimental partici-
pants (models). In order to induce empathy/goal sharing of
observers with the models, we changed the ‘‘observation with goal-
sharing’’ instruction of Experiment 2 in a way to stress the shared
goal of the two persons. Therefore, the observers were told that
they could help the model at the final recall. We reasoned that this
instruction not only induces shared goal-representations, but also
rules out the possibility that observers simply interpret the
instruction given to the model as an instruction they (the observers)
should follow. Besides this, the real-life setting, used in Experiment
3 and 4, allowed us to match the recall pattern of observers to the
recall pattern of real participants.
The results of Experiment 3 and 4 replicated the results
of Experiment 1 and 2. That is, observers mirrored the effect of
the forget instruction given to the observed model, but only
when the instruction given to the observers induced shared goal
representations.
In sum, we demonstrated that directed forgetting effect in the
observer was only present if the goal to encode specific memories
was the same or similar for the observer and the model. In four
experiments we gave evidence that observers suppressed List 1
items if they observed a model who was instructed to forget these
items. However, this effect was modulated by the instruction type
given to the observers. Observers only produced the directed
forgetting effect if they were instructed to share the goal of the
model. This means that if the observer’s goal is to acquire the same
information as the model, then any environmental manipulation
of the model’s behaviour will influence the accessibility of the
observer’s memories. It is important to note that goal sharing was
manipulated in two fundamentally different ways in Experiment 2
and Experiment 4. In Experiment 2 observers watched a movie
about the experiment, they had no contact with the models, and
because of this one could argue that observers may have not felt
empathy for the models or shared the model’s goal. More
importantly, as the observer were instructed to remember
everything that the model in the movie had to remember, this
may have forced them to instruct themselves the same way as the
experimenter instructed the model. However, in Experiment 4
observers took part in the same experiment as the model: they sat
next to them and they followed their behaviour from close
distance. This experimental design should have induced more
empathy in the observers for the model. Moreover, the instruction
also differed in Experiment 4. Observers were instructed that they
might have the chance to help the model at the final test. This
instruction probably led the observer to share the goal of the
model. Although there are major differences in the observer’s
instructions in Experiment 2 and 4, the two experiments produced
exactly the same pattern of results. This supports the conclusion
that shared goal of observers and models was the critical factor in
producing this observational directed forgetting effect.
A further contribution of Experiment 3 and 4 compared to
Experiment 1 and 2 is that the memory performance of the model
is known. The direct comparison of observers’ and models’
performance gave further evidence that observers mirrored the
memory performance of the model in Experiment 4, while their
performance was different from that of the model in Experiment 3.
In a narrower interpretation, our results provide relevant
evidence for theoretical accounts of directed forgetting. The
concept of retrieval inhibition [1] states that the forget instruction,
together with further learning of List 2 triggers an inhibitory
process in order to attenuate the interference of to-be-forgotten
items with to-be-remembered items. Inhibitory processes serve an
adaptive role to enhance the accessibility of reliable items and
suppress all unimportant and disturbing information. In contrast,
the context change hypothesis [20] proposed an account without
inhibition by suggesting that participants in the forget group will
create a larger than normal change in internal contextual
elements, and will treat the two study lists as separate events
because of the forget instruction. As a consequence, participants in
the forget group will encode List 1 words in a different context
than List 2 words, and there will be a contextual mismatch
between List 1 and final recall. According to this concept the
forget instruction plays no specific role in the directed forgetting
phenomenon, and it is replaceable with any other manipulation
causing a similar contextual change between the two study lists.
In our opinion the results of the present study fit better to the
concept of retrieval inhibition than to the context change
hypothesis. The forget instruction will carry the future importance
of studied information only if it targets goal-relevant aspects of the
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inhibitory processes for to-be-forgotten information, because it
informs the participant that these items are no longer relevant
from the perspective of the present goal of the learner, that is, the
successful recall of the studied items. An observer without the goal
to recall all relevant information from the point of view of the
model will not use the information of the forget instruction.
It is unclear, how the context change hypothesis could explain
the present results in a parsimonious way. To explain the recall
performance of the observers with this concept we should assume
that observers without shared goal with the models did not create a
new internal context for the second list as a response to the forget
instruction. Contrary, they have changed their mental context if
their goal was in accord with the model. Following the logic of this
account we should assume that the ‘‘observation with goal
sharing’’ instruction increased the encoding of contextual elements
compared to the ‘‘simple observation’’ instruction. One problem
with this explanation is that there has been no evidence for such an
association between goal-directed learning and internal context
encoding. Another, and more evident, problem is that enhanced
contextual encoding should have lead to a higher average recall
rate among observers instructed with ‘‘observation with goal
sharing’’ instruction. This is certainly not the case.
In sum, these results underlie the general assumption that
activation and suppression of episodic memory representations is
based on goal-related action plans [29]. It is important to note that
it has been widely documented that the suppression effect in the
directed forgetting procedure lowers the accessibility, but not the
availability of to-be-forgotten memories, meaning that these
memory items remain intact but become inaccessible by episodic
retrieval cues [2,14,30]. Our results support the assumption that
suppression of episodic memories is not automatically generated
by environmental cues but depends on the goals of the person who
encodes and retrieves them [29]. In a broader interpretation, these
results gave evidence that observers can mirror the suppression
memory effect of the model if they take the model’s action goals.
The central question of action mirroring is whether the
mechanism is a direct match between the perception of the
model’s action and the observer’s motor system [26] or whether it
is generated from goal interpretation via top-down processes [31].
Our results suggest that the mirroring of intentional forgetting
takes place in the latter form. When the observer shares the
model’s goal, they will encode items that are relevant to the model
and then they will manipulate the accessibility of their own
memories according to what seems to be relevant to the model in a
learning action. The exact nature of this process – whether it is an
action simulation or an end state emulation by different means – is
presently unclear, but our results point to a relevant aspect of
social learning. Human learners manipulate the activation level of
their own memory according to the specific goal of the
observation, and if this goal matches the goal of the observed
model than the observer will mirror the learning performance of
the model.
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